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THE NO OTHER PROSPECTIVE
PURCHASER REQUIREMENT OF
THE FAILING FIRM DEFENSE
I. INTRODUCTION
The failing firm doctrine is a judicially created defense to
actions brought under section I of the Clayton Act. Section 7
provides in part that "[n]o corporation engaged in commerce
shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole or any part of the
stock or other share capital ... of another corporation engaged
also in commerce, where in any line of commerce in any section
of the country, the effect of such acquisition may be substan-
tially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly."'
It is generally thought that the defense owes its existence to the
1930 case of Int2enational Shoe Co. v. FTC,2 although it does
find some support in earlier decisions.3 The legislative history
surrounding the 1950 amendment to section 7 of the Clayton Act
shows that Congress has sanctioned the defense4 and the United
States Supreme Court continues to recognize the doctrine prom-
ulgated in InternationaZ Shoe :5
1. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964).
2. 280 U.S. 291 (1930).
3. Two cases in particular lend support to the doctrine. In United States
v. United States Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417 (1920), the Supreme Court upheld
the acquisition of a -nearly worthless company by a competitor. The Court
noted that it was an emergency situation and concluded that "it seems like an
extreme accusation to say that the corporation which relieved it, and, perhaps,
rescued the company and the communities dependent upon it from disaster, was
urged by unworthy motives. Did illegality attach afterwards and how? And
what was the corporation to do with the property? Let it decay in desuetude,
or develop its capabilities and resources ?" Id. at 447. In American Press Ass'n
v. United States, 245 F. 91 (7th Cir. 1917), the court permitted the sale of a
company, which was going out of business, to its only competitor when there
were no other prospective purchasers. The court pointed out that "[niot every
joinder of competing businesses or acquisition of instrumentalities that have
been used in competition is an undue restraint of trade or a creation of a
monopoly. Each case must be measured by the rule of reason. And a funda-
mental test is injury to the public." Id. at 93.
See United States v. International Harvester Co., 214 F. 987, 998 (D. Minn.
1914) (dictum), appeal dismissed, 248 U.S. 587 (1918); Northwestern Con-
solidated Milling Co. v. William Cullam & Son, 177 F. 786, 788 (E.D. Mich.
1910). See also Aluminum Co. of America v. FTC, 284 F. 401, 408 (3rd Cir.
1922), cert. denied, 261 U.S. 616 (1923); United States v. Quaker Oats Co.,
232 F. 499, 503 (N.D. Ill. 1916), appeal dismissed, 253 U.S. 499 (1920).
4. H.R. REP. No. 1191, 81st Cong. 1st Sess. 6 (1949); S. REP. No. 1775,
81st Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1950).
5. Between 1930 and 1962 there was some doubt whether the United States
Supreme Court would recognize the defense again. All doubts were laid to
rest by the case of Brown Shoe Co. v. United States where the court took the
opportunity to reaffirm its willingness to allow the defense. 370 U.S. 294
(1962) (dictum). But see Citizen Publishing Co. v. United States, 89 S.Ct.
927 (1969). "We confine the failing company doctrine to its present narrow
scope." Id. at 931.
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In the case .. .of a corporation with resources so de-
pleted and the prospect of rehabilitation so remote that
it faced the grave probability of a business failure with
resulting loss to its stockholders and injury to the com-
munities where its plants were operated, we hold that
the purchase of its capital stock by a competitor (there
being no other prospective purchaser) . . does not
substantially lessen competition or restrain commerce
within the intent of the Clayton Act.6
The defense also can be raised where the converse is true. That
is, where the acquired firm is financially healthy and the com-
pany acquiring it claims to be failing within the meaning of
InternationaZ Shoe.7
One reason advanced for this exception to the federal anti-
trust law is that "the inferences of added dominance [in terms of
market power] which might ordinarily follow from such a pur-
chase are severely impaired if the acquired firm is so weak as to
be bankrupt."'s However, it is more likely that the defense ex-
hibits a legislative and judicial concern with protecting those
interests that would probably suffer if the merger were pro-
hibited and the failing company thus had to go out of business.
This probability of "resulting loss to . .. stockholders and in-
jury to the communities where . .. [the company's] plants were
operated"9 was noted in IntenationaZ Shoe.
The defense can be claimed in suits brought by private parties
as well as in actions by the United States government. 10 In fact,
the failing firm defense is probably "the only undisputed section
7 affirmative defense other than the 'investment exception'
specifically included in the act itself.""
There are two elements of proof in the failing firm defense:
(1) that the acquired or acquiring company was sufficiently
failing, and (2) that the competitor was the only prospective
purchaser. The degree of proof necessary to show that the com-
pany "faced the grave probability of a business failure"'2 is
6. 280 U.S. 291, 302 (1930).
7. United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 296 F.Supp. 994 (E.D. Wis. 1969).
8. Bok, Section 7 of The Clayton Act and The Merging of Law and Eco-
nomics, 74 HARV. L. REv. 226, 283 (1960).
9. 280 U.S. 291, 302 (1930).
10. Granader v. Public Bank, 281 F. Supp. 120 (E.D. Mich. 1967).
11. Low, The Failing Company Doctrine: An Illusive Economic Defense
Under Section 7 of The Clayton Act, 35 FoRDHA. L. Rxv. 425, 426 (1967).
12. 280 U.S. 291, 302 (1930).
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beyond the scope of this paper. 13 But, it is notable that courts
in sustaining the defense have described the failing companies
as "hopelessly insolvent' 4 or facing "imminent receivership"' 6
and in rejecting the defense have described the companies as not
being in "failing or bankrupt condition,"' 0 or as not facing
inevitable termination of the business or dispersal of its assets.
17
II. Tn R us mNT AND E REASON THEnEFoR
In International Shoe the Supreme Court noted parentheti-
cally that there were no other prospective purchasers.:' This
brief reference led several writers to question whether or not this
condition was a material part of the failing firm defense.19 The
legislative history surrounding the 1950 amendment to section
7 of the Clayton Act did not explicitly adopt this limitation,20
but the courts generally have viewed it as a requirement of the
defense.2' The issue was clearly resolved in the recent case of
Citizen PzbZlishing Co. v. United States where the Supreme
Court said: "The failing company doctrine plainly cannot be
applied in a merger or in any other case unless it is established
that the company that acquires it or brings it under dominion is
the only available purchaser."
22
There has been some support for the proposition that this
limitation on the defense should be imposed because a firm with
13. For a discussion of this requirement see: Low, The Failing Compan.v
Doctrine: An Illusive Economic Defense Under Section 7 Of The Clayton Act,
35 FoRDHAm L. REv. 425 (1967); Note, Horizontal Mergers and the "Failing
Firm" Defense Under Section 7 of the Clayton Act: A Caveat, 45 VA. L. REv.
421 (1959).
14. Maryland and Virginia Milk Producers Ass'n v. United States, 167 F.
Supp. 779, 808 (D.D.C. 1958), affd in part and revd in part, 362 U.S. 458
(1960).
15. United States v. Diebold, Inc., 197 F. Supp. 902 (S.D. Ohio 1961),
re'd., 369 U.S. 654 (1962).
16. Crown Zellerback Corp. v. FTC, 296 F.2d 800 (9th Cir. 1961).
17. Erie Sand and Gravel Co. v. FTC, 291 F.2d 279, 280 (3rd Cir. 1961).
The general statement comes from Dean Foods Co., CCH, ff 17, 765 Trade
Reg. Reports 23,112 (1966).
18. 280 U.S. 291, 302 (1930).
19. Bok, Section 7 of The Clayton Act and The Merging of Law and Eco-
nwmics, 74 HARV. L. R v. 226, 344-45 (1960) ; Wiley, THE "FAILING COM-
PANY" A Real Defense in Horizontal Merger Cases, 41 B.U.L. REv. 495
(1961); Note, Horizontal Mergers and the "Failing Firm" Defense Under
Section 7 of the Clayton Act: A Caveat, 45 VA. L. REv. 421 (1959).
20. See H.R. REP. No. 1191, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1949); S. REP. No.
1775, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1950).
21. E.g., United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654 (1962), rev'g, 197
F. Supp. 902 (S.D. Ohio 1961); United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 296
F. Supp. 994 (E.D. Wis. 1969); United States v. Reed Roller Bit Co., 274
F. Supp. 573 (W.D. Okla. 1967).
22. 89 S. Ct. 927, 931 (1969).
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other offers outstanding can not be described as "failing" -within
the meaning of InterationaZ Shoe.23 "[T]he courts sometimes
take it as an indication that a company was prosperous enough
to continue on its own."'24 In Citizen, however, the Supreme
Court said that the real reason for this requirement is that "if
another person or group could be interested, a unit in the com-
petitive system would be preserved and not lost to monopoly
power." 25
III. Wzo ARE TEm OTHER PROsPEcmTiVE PuRCnAsEs-
TIM PROBLE31S OF RECOGNION AND DETEMLiNATION
To successfully invoke the failing firm defense one must prove
that there were no other prospective purchasers. Although it is
clear what must be proved, it is not quite so clear what will
disprove this requirement. In other words, how does the failing
company recognize that there are other prospective purchasers
or determine that there are none. 26
A. The. Prospective Purchaser Status:
(1) Inuirzes
As an evidentiary matter, when does one become a prospective
purchaser rather than a casual inquirer. No court has made a
definitive statement of what will effect this transformation, but
cases show that something less than a firm offer will suffice.27
Moreover, making studies of the failing company 28 or soliciting
the ownership-management to consider tentative schemes 29 may
elevate one to the prospective purchaser status. What other
actions will confer this status is a matter of conjecture. The
courts have heretofore applied objective tests to determine
whether or not one was a prospective purchaser. They have con-
23. Bok, Section 7 Of The Clayton Act and The Merging Of Law and Eco-
ot0nics, 75 HARV. L. REv. 226, 347 (1960).
24. Low, The Failing Company Doctrine: An Illusive Economic Defense
Under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 35 FoRDHAm L. REV. 425, 434 (1967).
25. 89 S. Ct. 927, 931 (1969). Although the reasoning of the Court is well
taken, this statement is predicated on the assumption that acquisition by any
other person or group could not itself create a monopoly.
26. See also Wiley, THE "FAILING COMPANY;" A Real Defense in
Horizontal Merger Cases, 41 B.U.L. REV. 495 (1961).
27. See, e.g., United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654 (1962), reveg, 197
F. Supp. 902 (S.D. Ohio 1961); United States v. Reed Roller Bit Co., 274
F. Supp. 573 (W.D. Okla. 1967).
28. See United States v. Reed Roller Bit Co., 274 F. Supp. 573 (W.D. Okla.
1967).
29. See United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654 (1962), reV'g, 197
F. Supp. 902 (S.D. Ohio 1961).
[Vol. 22
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Noms
sidered overt manifestations of intent-known to the failing firm
-which could reasonably lead the observer to conclude that the
actor was more than a mere casual inquirer.
Notably, the Supreme Court recently reworded the require-
ment. In Internationa Shoe the Court spoke of no other pros-
peetive purchasers.80 In Citizen the Supreme Court said that the
requirement was satisfied if there were no other available pur-
chasers.3 1 It is arguable that this change in words indicates a
tacit approval of the common sense standards previously applied
by courts in determining whether this requirement had been met.
At any rate, it does not appear that the failing firm will have
to consider every inquirer a prospective purchaser.
(2) Other Offers
Closely akin to the casual inquiry problem is the question of
whether any other offer will destroy the defense. Manifestly,
this question is addressed to the situation where the failing com-
pany has received other offers smaller than that tendered by the
acquiring competitor. Since one does not even have to make a
firm offer to become a prospective purchaser, it could be argued
that any offeror is automatically a prospective purchaser. The
answer to this contention would seem to be that just as every
inquirer is not considered a prospective purchaser neither should
every offeror.
The courts have been confronted with the "other smaller
offer" factual situation; but, because they found that the firms
were not sufficiently failing, they did not have to rule on this
issue. 32 In one case, however, where the failing company defense
was upheld, the court rejected the idea that other offers would
defeat the requirement that there be no other prospective pur-
chaser.38 The court construed this requirement to mean, that
when there are two or more offers, the failing firm is only re-




There are good reasons for requiring the failing firm to con-
sider other offers. "Frequently the least acceptable prospective
30. 280 U.S. 291, 302 (1930).
31. 89 S.Ct. 927, 931 (1969).
32. United States v. Third Nat. Bank, 390 U.S. 171 (1968); Erie Sand &
Gravel Co. v. FTC, 291 F.2d 279 (3rd Cir. 1961); United States v. Jos. Schlitz
Brewing Co., 253 F. Supp. 129 (N.D. Cal. 1966).
33. Granader v. Public Bank, 281 F. Supp. 120 (E.D. Mich. 1967).
34. Id. at 123.
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acquirers will be in a position to bid the most."8 5 Also, "the
owner's desire to receive a high price is only one of several inter-
ests underlying [and protected by] the failing-firm defense. '3 6
But requiring the failing company to consider other offers is not
the same thing as saying that every offeror is a prospective pur-
chaser. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that although the courts
may (and probably should) require the failing firm to prove that
it accepted only "the best offer under the circumstances," they
will not hold that the mere existence of other offers runs afoul of
the "no other prospective purchaser" requirement.
B. A Duty To So~lcit Other Prospective Purchasers
The two potential problems just discussed could arise if the
failing firm did nothing. That is, the failing firm theoretically
could receive inquiries or other offers through no effort of its
own. But, what if there are no inquiries or other offers? Can
the failing company thus conclude that there are no other
prospective purchasers? Or, does it have a duty to solicit other
prospective purchasers? There was some early support for the
proposition that a failing company could satisfy the "no other
prospective purchaser" requirement by showing that the com-
pany was failing so badly that it "could not have achieved a sale
to anyone else."13 7 Now, however, it is settled that the failing firm
must prove that it made affirmative efforts to sell to someone
other than the acquiring competitor if it hopes to establish that
there were no other prospective purchasers.3 8
The question now becomes, what efforts must the failing firm
make in order to satisfy this "duty to solicit" requirement? One
writer suggests that "[t]he effort to be expended . . . [should]
be inversely proportional to the state of decline .. .[of the
failing firm], but [that] there should always be a duty . .. to
solicit more than one buyer. 3 9 The courts have not been quite so
formulistic. Moreover, they have indicated that the failing com-
35. Comment, Federal Antitrust Law-Mergers-An Updating Of The
"Failing Company" Doctrine In The Amended § 7 Setting, 61 MIcH. L. Rxv.
566, 582 (1963).
36. Bok, Section 7 of the Clayton Act and The Merging of Law and Eco-
nomics, 74 HARv. L. REv. 226, 346 (1960).
37. United States v. Diebold, Inc., 197 F. Supp. 902, 907 (S.D. Ohio 1961),
rev'd, 369 U.S. 654 (1962); accord, American Press Ass'n v. United States,
245 F. 91, 93 (7th Cir. 1917); see Aluminum Co. of America v. FTC, 284 F.
401, 410 (3rd Cir. 1922) (dissenting opinion), cert. denied, 261 U.S. 616
(1923).
38. Citizen Publishing Co. v. United States, 89 S. Ct. 927, 931 (1969).
39. Comment, Federal Antitrust Law-Mergers- An Updating Of The
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pany should make "every reasonable effort to explore alterna-
tive management and merger possibilities."40 This would include
"a well-conceived and thorough canvass of the industry such as
to ferret out viable alternative partners for merger."41 But
casual conversations at chance meetings and industry conven-
tions probably would not be considered a well considered and
thorough canvass of the industry.42
The courts have not attempted to specify exactly what steps
a failing firm must take in order to show that it made every
reasonable effort to find other prospective purchasers. In Citizen
the Court noted that "no effort was made to sell the Citizen;
its properties and franchise were not put in the hands of a
broker."48 The Court was probably suggesting that this would
have been a reasonable procedure to adopt under the facts of that
case, not that it must be done in every case. It is likely that the
courts would agree that they "cannot apply a simple rule of
thumb, for the particular circumstances of the failing firm and
the industry within which it operates will doubtless determine
whether a reasonable attempt shall include sounding out rival
firms, contacting a business broker, or advertising in a financial
periodical." 44 The failing firm will likewise have to determine
what is reasonable under the circumstances, and act accordingly.
IV. CoNCLUsIoN
Any company claiming the failing firm defense will have to
prove that there were no other prospective purchasers. Since this
defense is predicated on the assumption that the merger or com-
bination under attack does in fact violate the letter, if not the
spirit, of Section 7 of the Clayton Act the requirement is a rea-
sonable one. If another non-objectionable purchaser could be
found there would be no reason to fit the transaction within an
exemption to the federal anti-trust law. Thus the courts should
require that the company raising the defense be able to prove
that it was reasonably sure, and that it was reasonable in so be-
lieving, that there were no other prospective purchasers. Appar-
ently this is all that the courts will ask and all that is required
of the failing company. CARi, G. F aGusoN
40. United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 296 F. Supp. 994, 1002 (E.D. Wis.
1969).
41. Id.
42. See Dean Foods Co., CCH 17, 765 Trade Reg. Reports 20,093 (1966).
43. 89 S. Ct. 927, 931 (1969).
44. Bok, Section 7 Of The Clayton Act And The Merging Of Law And
Economics, 74 HARv. L. Rav. 226, 346 (1960).
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